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This paper investigates the impact of habits on economic growth in an overlapping
generations (OLG) economy with physical and human capital in which altruistic parents
finance the education of their children. Habit formation interacts with the role of human
capital as an engine of growth by reducing education spending in the short run and by
increasing the wage rate and decreasing the interest rate in the long run. When relative risk
aversion (RRA) lies around unity, or when the RRA is no less than one and production is
physical capital intensive and the level of the total production factor is large or the strength of
habits are large, the effect of increasing the wage rate dominates the other effects and,
therefore, the desired level of human capital investment increases in the long run, with habits.
As a result, compared with a case with time-separable utility, the stationary growth rate
implied by a model with habits is higher.
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Since Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990) showed that the risk premium puzzle
can be resolved using habit formation, many studies have shown that habits are
statistically signiﬁcant in explaining consumers’ behavior (e.g., Naik and Moore
1996), asset markets dynamics and the business cycle (Boldrin et al. 2001). Habit
persistence also brings a new dimension to policy studies (e.g., Fuhrer 2000). A
large number of contributions related to habits exist; however, these have been
limited to the analysis without human capital.
This paper explores the implications of habit formation in overlapping gener-
ations (OLG) economies with human and physical capital1. In particular, we
investigate the impact of habits on human capital investment and the growth rate.
Parents derive utility from the human capital of their children and hence invest
during their productive period in their children’s education. When parents retire,
the labor income of their children is not transferred to their parents and therefore
parental spending on children’s human capital is not motivated by the amount
of the transfer anticipated from children during old age 2. This framework shows
that a rise in the strength of habits lowers educational spending to smooth the
utility over an agent’s lifetime when the relative risk aversion (RRA) is large and,
when the RRA is low, there is no impact. Further, an increase in the strength of
habits always lowers the human–physical capital ratio, and this in turn increases
the wage rate and decreases the interest rate in the balanced growth path.
It is well known that with habits the desired stock of physical capital increases3.
Therefore, the growth rate decreases with the standard neoclassical production
function because of the diminishing marginal returns on capital. In our model,
which introduces human capital, when the RRA lies around one, or the RRA is no
less than one and the share of physical capital is large enough and the strength of
habits is strong enough, or the RRA is no less than one and the share of physical
capital is large enough and the level of total production factor is no less than one,
the eﬀect of the increasing wage rate dominates the other eﬀects and long-run
human capital investment increases with habits. Consequently, and contrary to
1Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) and Wendner (2001) also construct the OLG model with habits,
but they do not introduce human capital.
2This setting appears valid in industrialized economies where advanced social security systems
exist. According to a questionnaire survey exploring the Japanese lifestyle carried out by the
Japanese Economic Planning Agency, 49.6% of respondents think that they should ﬁnancially
support their children while they are students. Furthermore, 5.9% of respondents believe that
they should ﬁnancially support their children until they marry. In spite of such long-term assis-
tance, approximately 90% of respondents do not desire an economic payoﬀ from their children
(Economic Planning Agency 1994).
3See, for instance, Wendner (2002).
1well-known facts, the stationary growth rate with habits is higher than that in the
case with time-separable utility.
2 An OLG Economy with Education Spending
and Habits
We consider an overlapping generations economy where individuals live for two
periods and are considered to be “young” or “old”. We assume that each individual
works and only consumes when old. Members of each generation are identical and
inelastically supply one unit of labor when they are young. There is no population
growth. The preferences of a generation, t, are represented by the additively















where ¾ is the relative risk aversion (RRA), c1
t is consumption of the young at
period t, c2
t+1 is the consumption of the old at period t + 1, and ¯ 2 (0;1) is the
subjective discount factor. Following Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), instantaneous
utility in the second period of life is derived from the diﬀerence between current
consumption and a fraction of past consumption. Parameter ° 2 [0;1] indexes
the strength of habits or the importance of past consumption in the instantaneous
utility function. An individual of generation t spends on their children’s education
an amount et in period t. This results in a per capita level of children’s human
capital:
ht+1 = Aet; (2)
where A > 0 and ht+1 is the human capital of an individual in generation t + 1;
hence, ht+1 stands for the eﬀective labor supply 4. Young agents gain the wage
rate wt, which is a real value for one unit of labor supply, ht, and spend it for
consumption c1
t and education spending et, or savings st. They can buy Rt+1st
units of consumption goods in the second period, where Rt+1 is the gross interest
rate at period t + 1. The budget constraints of agents are then:
c
1




t+1 = Rt+1st: (4)
4As in Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), to simplify the analysis in the sequel, we disregard the
eﬀect of parent’s human capital on the oﬀspring’s human capital level.
2In generation t an individual maximizes the utility (1) subject to the budget con-
straints (3) and (4), and (2) (arguments are c1
t, c2
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We assume that the value of RRA is as follows:
Assumption 1
¾ ¸ 1.
Estimates of RRA usually lie around or above unity. Therefore, it can be said that
this range is empirically plausible. Here, we have a result that is similar to Lahiri
and Puhakka (1998) and Wendner (2001). Namely, for the value of RRA assumed
in Assumption 1, the higher the strength of the habit formation, the higher are
the savings in the short run5. In addition to this, we can see how habit formation
aﬀects educational spending from equation (6).
Lemma 1
Habit formation aﬀects educational spending as follows in the short run. When
the relative risk aversion is one, it has no eﬀect on educational spending. When the
relative risk aversion is above one, the higher the strength of the habit formation,
the lower is educational spending.
When RRA is low, utility does not decrease as much if the agent reduces con-
sumption6. Therefore, agents greatly reduce ﬁrst-period consumption in order to
prevent the second-period marginal utility from increasing because of an increase
in the strength of habits. On the other hand, they do not need to increase savings
as much because the increase in the marginal utility in the second period (caused
by a rise in habits) is not as large. Agents then spend the remaining income on
their children’s education. When RRA is high, on the other hand, utility de-
creases dramatically by reducing consumption. Therefore, agents do not reduce
ﬁrst-period consumption as much. Instead, they reduce educational spending to
increase savings.




















¾ ¡ °(Rt+1 + °)¡1 > 0 for all Rt+1 > 0 from Assumption 1. Therefore, dst
d° > 0 for all t under
Assumption 1.
6When RRA is below one (although this range is excluded by Assumption 1), the greater the
strength of habit formation, the higher is educational spending.
33 Endogenous Growth and Habits
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of habit formation on growth. We take the
economy’s production function to be homogenous, of degree one, and production
factors are physical capital and human capital (equivalent to ‘eﬃcient labor’). The






where B > 0 is the level of total production factor (TPF), ® 2 (0;1) is the share
parameter of physical capital, and kt is the per capita stock of physical capital
in period t. The ﬁrms behave perfectly and competitively to maximize proﬁts.
Capital depreciates at rate one. In this setting, we have:










As we assume no population growth, the market clearing condition becomes:
kt+1 = st: (10)






















































where Ât ´ ht


















In the Appendix A.1, we show that there exists a unique positive stable steady-

















Under Assumption 1, a rise in the strength of habits formation decreases the
steady-state human–physical capital ratio.
4Habit formation aﬀects the human–physical capital ratio by aﬀecting savings, and
by aﬀecting education spending as given in Lemma 1. An increase in habits in-
creases savings and, consequently, it increases the amount of physical capital. On
the other hand, whether it decreases or does not aﬀect education spending de-
pends on the value of RRA and, therefore, it decreases or does not aﬀect the level
of human capital. Consequently, the human–physical capital ratio decreases as the
strength of habits becomes greater.
Using the steady-state ratio Â in either (11) or (12), we obtain the stable steady-
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where Γ = R¡ ¾¡1
¾ (R+°)¡ 1








¾ > 0, and
Ψ = R¡ ¾¡1
¾ [¯
1
¾ + °(R + °)¡ 1
¾] > 0. The Direct Eﬀect on the growth rate is that
habit formation directly aﬀects the growth rate by aﬀecting education spending.
This eﬀect, whether it decreases or does not aﬀect the growth rate, depends on the
value of RRA through aﬀecting education spending as in Lemma 1. The Indirect
Eﬀect on the growth rate is that habit formation indirectly aﬀects the growth rate
by aﬀecting the human–physical capital ratio. An increase in the strength of habit
formation decreases the ratio under Assumption 1 as given in Lemma 2. However,
how falls in this ratio aﬀect the growth rate is ambiguous. It increases the wage
rate from (8). That is, human capital becomes scarce relative to physical capital by
the force of habit formation and therefore the wage rate per unit of eﬀective labor
supply increases. Furthermore, an increase in the wage rate increases education
spending from (6). In turn, this increases the growth rate (Wage Eﬀect). On the
other hand, it decreases the gross interest rate from (9), and whether it decreases or
does not aﬀect education spending depends on the value of RRA. Furthermore, a
decrease in the human–physical capital ratio lowers the growth rate when the value
of RRA is above one (Interest Rate Eﬀect). Whether the Wage Eﬀect or Interest
Rate Eﬀect dominates depends on the parameter values. Here, we obtain the
following suﬃcient, but not necessary, condition for an increase in habit persistence
to increase the growth rate within the range of ¾ ¸ 1 (see Appendix A.2 for the
proof).
5Proposition 1
Consider a stable steady-state growth rate in an OLG economy with human capital
and physical capital. If the relative risk aversion (¾) lies around 1, or the relative
risk aversion is no less than one and the share of physical capital (®) is large
enough and the strength of habits (°) is great enough, or the relative risk aversion
is no less than one and the share of physical capital is large enough and the level of
total production factor (B) is no less than one, the greater the strength of habits,
the higher the steady-state growth rate (µ).
As RRA approaches one, the Interest Rate Eﬀect approaches zero and therefore
the Indirect Eﬀect becomes positive (because the Wage Eﬀect is always positive)
and, furthermore, the Direct Eﬀect approaches zero. Consequently, an increase
in habits increases the steady-state growth rate. When RRA is larger than one,
on the other hand, the Direct Eﬀect is negative. However, when the share of
physical capital is large enough, the Interest Rate Eﬀect becomes weaker and the
Wage Eﬀect dominates. Therefore, the Indirect Eﬀect is positive. Moreover, when
the level of TPF is large enough, the interest rate is also great enough from (9).
As the interest rate or the strength of habits becomes larger, the Direct Eﬀect
becomes smaller (note that the Direct Eﬀect contains R¡ ¾¡1
¾ (R + °)¡ 1
¾). Namely,
a high interest rate allows agents higher consumption for a unit of savings in
the second period and therefore an increase in habits do not reduce educational
spending as much. Furthermore, the degree of habit formation in second-period
utility decreases with the strength of habits because of the strong concavity of the
utility function. Consequently, when the value of TPF or the strength of habits
is large, the Indirect Eﬀect (which is positive in this case) dominates the Direct
Eﬀect (which is negative in this case); therefore, an increase in habits increases
the steady-state growth rate when the share of physical capital is large enough
and the level of TPF or the strength of habits is great enough.
To examine more explicitly how habit formation aﬀects the growth rate, we
construct a simple numerical example. The combination of parameter values is:
¯ = 0:5, A = B = 3:5. We vary the values of RRA and the share of physical
capital (these are key parameter values in our analysis) within a range that is
consistent with the empirical evidence as: ¾ =1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, and 4.0,
and ® =0.28 and ® =0.337. We examine how the eﬀect of habit formation on the
7Epstein and Zin (1989) found values of relative risk aversion clustering around unity, con-
sistent with the widely used logarithmic utility function. Constantinides et al. (2002) presented
alternative evidence to suggest that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion lies plausibly within
the range 2–5 by using habit formation. Considering these empirical studies, we set the range
of relative risk aversion as 1–4. Moreover, according to Greenwood et al. (1993, p.6), the share
of physical capital in market production deducted from the US national accounts could be any-
where between 0.25 and 0.43, depending on various details, such as the treatment of proprietor’s
6¾ 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
® =0.33 varying °
°=0 Â 3.50 3.10 2.83 2.66 2.50 2.37 2.30
µ 1.37 1.29 1.20 1.17 1.13 1.13 1.12
°=0.3 Â 2.91 2.31 1.99 1.76 1.56 1.44 1.39
µ 1.46 1.34 1.29 1.27 1.20 1.18 1.14
® =0.28 varying °
°=0 Â 3.50 2.94 2.60 2.34 2.15 1.99 1.89
µ 1.56 1.41 1.36 1.32 1.29 1.26 1.26
°=0.3 Â 2.85 2.13 1.75 1.50 1.29 1.13 1.07
µ 1.66 1.50 1.41 1.34 1.29 1.25 1.21
Table 1: The value of Â and µ when ¯ = 0:5 and A = B = 3:5
growth rate changes depending on these values by varying the strength of habits
from ° = 0 to ° = 0:3. Table 1 shows that, for each value of ¾ and ®, the
human–physical capital ratio (Â) in the case of ° = 0:3 is lower than that of ° = 0,
which is consistent to Lemma 2. Moreover, in most of the cases excluding (®;¾) =
(0:28;3:0);(0:28;3:5); and (0:28;4:0) (these are cases where RRA is departed from
one and the production share of human capital is not large enough and therefore
do not satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1), the growth rate (µ) in the case of
° = 0:3 is higher than that of ° = 0.
4 Conclusions
This paper explores the impact of habits on the growth rate in OLG economies
where altruistic parents ﬁnance their children’s education costs. Compared with
the case without habits (with a time-separable utility function), the stationary
growth rate is higher when the relative risk aversion lies around one, or the relative
risk aversion is no less than one and the share of physical capital is large enough
and the strength of habits is great enough, or the relative risk aversion is no less
than one and the share of physical capital is large enough and the level of total
production factor is no less than one.
income. We vary the values of the share of physical capital from 0.33 (which is most widely used
in the literature) to 0.28.
7A Appendix
A.1 The Unique Existence of Equilibrium Â
In this Appendix, we prove that there exists a unique Â that satisﬁes (13).
Substituting Â = Ât = Ât+1 into (13), and using Ât = ht





















where R is the steady-state interest rate. We deﬁne the left-hand side of (A.1) as








































R+° is increasing in R or constant for ° 2 [0;1], it
is obvious that f00(R) > 0 for all R > 0. We can also derive the relations g0(R) > 0
for all R > 0, f0(0) = 0 < (A¯)
1
¾ = g0(0), and f0(1) = 1 > (A¯)
1
¾ = g0(1).
Therefore, given A > 0, B > 0, ® 2 (0;1), ¯ 2 (0;1), ° 2 [0;1], and ¾ > 0, there
exists a unique positive R that satisﬁes (A.1). Then, there exists unique positive





A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We can rewrite the relation (16) as:
dµ
d°




0 ¡ [(¾ ¡ 1)° + ¾R]
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> 0 for all A > 0, B > 0, ® 2 (0;1), ¯ 2 (0;1),
and ° 2 [0;1] when ¾ approaches 1 from (A.2). Next, let us consider the case with
¾ ¸ 1 and ® approaches 1. From (9), we obtain lim®!1 R = B. Then, as ® ! 1,















> 0. Therefore, when ® approaches 1 and also





> 0 for all A > 0, B > 0, ¯ 2 (0;1), and ¾ ¸ 1.
Mreover, (¾¡1)(°Φ+° ¡1)+¾B(1+Φ) = (¾¡1)°(1+Φ)+¾(B ¡1+BΦ)+1.





> 0 for all
A > 0, ¯ 2 (0;1), ° 2 [0;1], and ¾ ¸ 1.
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